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The Human Person, by David Braine. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1992. Pp. xxv and 555. $32.95 (cloth). 
STEWART GOETZ, Ursinus College 
In this long but interesting book, the author attempts to defend an Aristote-
lian-Thomist view of a human being against materialist and dualist alterna-
tives. He asserts that modern materialistic conceptions of a human being 
share with dualism the false thesis that a human being is an aggregate of 
causally related parts. Against the metaphysical atomism of both views, 
Braine insists that a human being is a unified whole whose parts are integrated 
in a way which Aristotle captured with his matter-form ontology. A human 
being is a psychophysical unity whose principles of behavior involve life and 
consciousness in ways which are not explicable in terms of the relationships 
of parts. 
According to materialists and dualists, a human being is composed of a 
mental part which is inner and a bodily part which is outer. Materialists 
maintain that the subject of the inner mental life is the brain; dualists assert 
that it is the substantial soul. Though they differ about the identity of the 
inner subject, they agree in their conception of the mental as something 
internal which is causally related to what occurs in the outer bodily world. 
In contrast to materialists and dualists, the author asserts that the mental is 
essentially a 'hybrid' notion: the mental is logically inextricable from the 
patterns of bodily behavior in which it is reflected, without the mental being 
reduced to the physical. There is no inner mental or experiential element 
which can be isolated from the external bodily behavior and which is causally 
related to the latter. In perception, sensation, emotion and intentional action, 
mental and physical aspects must be viewed as essentially intertwined such 
that neither can be understood in abstraction from the other. 
To illustrate the difference in the atomistic and holistic views, consider 
Braine's discussion of intentional human action. On the materialist-dualist 
view, intentional bodily action is preceded by a separate inner event of will-
ing, undertaking, or trying which causally produces certain appropriate bodily 
movements. This inner event is revealed in cases of failed action where an 
agent thinks he has acted but has not. In such instances, the agent must have 
done something, otherwise he would not believe that he acted. Since no 
bodily event occurred, it must be the case that what the agent did was will, 
undertake, or try. 
On the holistic or hybrid view of intentional action, there is no separate 
inner mental event which causally produces the agent's bodily action. The 
primary expression of will is in intentional bodily action itself and not in 
anything separable from the bodily action such as a prior willing or choice. 
We are essentially animal, bodily agents, and what we experience as such is 
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not some introspectable mental event which produces our bodily movements 
but ourselves as bodily agents who actively move about among other bodily 
entities and directly causally interact with them. 
While holism insists on the irreducible psychophysical nature of a human 
being, it also insists that a human being transcends the body, but without a 
return to dualism. The insight into this transcendence comes with the use of 
language. The use of language involves understanding at two levels. First, 
there is an understanding of langue in virtue of which words of speech have 
meaning in their own right. Second, there is an understanding of parole or 
speech which is the exercise of the underlying understanding of langue. 
These two kinds of understanding are present in both speaking and thinking 
in the medium of words. Of greatest importance for the human being's 
transcendence of the body is the fact that these kinds of understanding and 
thinking cannot be the states or operations of any bodily organ or material 
system. 
Because these kinds of understanding and thinking cannot be states or 
operations of anything material, it is natural to think that they are operations 
of a substantial soul which is distinct from and can survive the death of its 
body. It is natural to think that if an operation is not bodily in nature, then 
the subject of that operation must itself be a nonbodily entity with that 
operation constituting its nature or essence. But a nature or essence is not 
defined in terms of some of an entity's operations, but all of them. And, since 
the subject of the operation of understanding is also the subject of the opera-
tions of perception, sensation, emotion and intentional action which are bod-
ily in nature, the suhject cannot be a substantial soul. Rather, it must itself 
be bodily in nature. Thus, the human being's transcendence of the body is 
not a matter of its having as one of its parts a substantial soul which exists 
in its own right but rather a matter of the human being existing in its own 
right and having states and operations which are not bodily. It is because we 
can speak of the holistically conceived human being existing in its own right 
that we can also speak derivatively of the human soul. But given the truth 
of holism, what is capable of surviving death cannot be a substantial soul. 
Rather, it is best thought of as a non-substantial person existing in a deprived 
state until the day of resurrection. 
Braine's principal opponent in defending holism is dualism (modern mate-
rialism just adopts the inner-outer dichotomy of dualism). What supposedly 
recommends holism over dualism is that it best accords with our primordial, 
pre-critical ways of thinking whose categories are holistic in nature. In other 
words, the holistic way of viewing human beings is allegedly rooted in our 
ordinary-life ways of speaking and thinking which view perception, sensa-
tion, emotion and intentional action as essentially hybrid in nature. 
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The problem with this justification of holism, a problem which Braine does 
not discuss, is that while the ordinary person might talk holistically, he does 
not think holistically. On the contrary, the ordinary person thinks dualisti-
cally: he thinks of himself as a substance in its own right which is separate 
from and can survive the death of its physical body. That the ordinary person 
thinks this way is evidenced by the fact that he has no difficulty in conceiving 
of himself leaving his body in an out-of-the-body experience and seeing and 
hearing the physicians struggle frantically to revive his lifeless body. Simi-
larly, the ordinary person has no conceptual difficulties with accounts given 
by people who claim to have died and seen a brilliant light at the end of a 
dark tunnel. On Braine's account of the human being, however, such reports 
must be conceptually incoherent because the perceptual experiences of seeing 
and hearing are operations of bodily organs. 
That the ordinary person can conceive of such out-of-the-body experiences 
should not surprise us, given that the body, in Braine's words, 'does not 
obtrude' in seeing and hearing. Thus, in discussing sight, Braine points out 
how we are not aware of our eyes at all in seeing. There is no consciousness 
of events in our eyes and neither the image in the retina nor anything going 
on in the pupil of the eye nor any action of the eyes is an intervening object 
of attention towards which the mind is directed in being directed at its prin-
cipal object in the external world. In short, we seem to be entities which see 
from behind our eyes. Given this phenomenology of sight and the fact that 
thinking is not a bodily event, it is natural to think that there is a substantial 
soul which is the subject of both of these operations and which is causally 
related to the eyes. 
In addition to the phenomenology of sight, Braine recognizes another rea-
son which explains why ordinary persons are dualists. Like other contempo-
rary philosophers of mind such as Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit, Braine 
asserts that we seem to ourselves to be simple entities with no separable parts. 
"A block of wood is divisible into parts each of which is also a block of wood . 
. . . By contrast, there is no question of dividing an 'I' ... into parts. The '1' . 
. . presents itself as undivided and indivisible. . .. [Wjhen we think of the 
'I' ... as undivided and indivisible, we are somehow denying that, as such, 
it has parts at all rather than thinking of some special kind of integratedness 
of its parts." (p. 315) Because the human body is made up of parts and is 
easily divisible, it is natural to believe that the 'I' which is indivisible cannot 
be identical with its body but must be a separate substance in its own right. 
What is puzzling about holism is not only its insistence that dualism must 
be false, in spite of these considerations which so clearly recommend dual-
ism's truth, but also its claim that the person which survives death is not an 
entity with a nature in its own right. Braine points out how on the Thomist 
view the 'soul' derives its individuation as an entity from its origin with its 
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body. Such a view makes a relation logically prior to the terms which it 
relates: the terms of the relation derive their being from standing in the 
relation. This view gets things backwards. It is intuitively plausible to view 
a relation as dependent for its obtaining on its ontologically independent 
terms. Hence, for a soul to exist in relation to its body, each one's existence 
must be independent of the relation in which it stands to the other. 
Braine will respond that viewing the human being as a substantial soul in 
relation to a substantial body destroys the unity of the human being. To 
preserve this unity, there must be no question of a substantial soul being 
incarnated or re-incarnated with a separately originating body. In defending 
this view, however, he is simply at odds with what the ordinary human being 
can conceive. For the very reasons he so ably sets forth (e.g., the simplicity 
of the T, the phenomenology of perception), the ordinary person is able to 
conceive of incarnation and re-incarnation. And this indicates that the ordi-
nary person does not think of himself as unified with his body in the way 
that Braine asserts. This is important, because in reading a book such as 
Braine's, one often comes away with the impression that dualism is the 
invention of a philosopher such as Descartes. But it isn't. Descartes phi-
losophized about dualism; he did not invent it. Where Descartes' view con-
flicts with the ordinary person's view of the human being is not with regard 
to the soul's existence but with respect to its spatiality. When the ordinary 
person thinks of the soul, he thinks of it as an ethereal or ghostly entity with 
a shape like that of a human body. This lends support to Braine's position 
that the ordinary person thinks of himself as a bodily being. Descartes argued 
that the soul cannot be in space because anything which is in space is ex-
tended and, thereby, divisible into parts. Perhaps, what is needed is a serious 
reconsideration of whether or not a substantial soul could both be a bodily 
being in space and indivisible. This would involve the soul being a body in 
a different sense than its being a physical body, but perhaps such a concept 
should not be too readily dismissed. 
In conclusion, while Braine's holistic view of the human being is not 
without its problems, there is much in The Human Person from which one 
can learn. It is a book well worth reading. 
Hell: The Logic of Damnation, by Jerry L. Walls. Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1992. Pp. 182. $26.95 (cloth). 
THOMAS TALBOTT, Willamette University. 
As he expresses it himself, Jerry Walls' purpose in writing his book "is to 
shJW that some recognizably traditional views of hell are compatible with 
both the divine nature and human nature" (p. 14). He defends a two-fold 
thesis: first that, for all we know, God had good reasons to create persons 
